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VARIETIES OF CITIZENSHIP
Linda Bosniak*
During this Symposium, we will use the concept of citizenship to talk
about all kinds of things: about the enjoyment of rights of various kinds,
about political and civic engagements, about experiences of collective
identity and solidarity, and about the possession of formal national
membership status or nationality. As you can see, "citizenship" is a term
that does a lot of work-perhaps too much work. However, as requested by
the organizers, I am going to address myself to the last understanding of
citizenship I have mentioned: citizenship in the formal national status
sense. I will do that by talking about a class of people who lack that status
by legal definition-the class the law calls aliens. Understanding the
condition of aliens is obviously important for practical reasons, given that,
in this country and all over the world, increasing numbers of people find
themselves living outside of their countries of nationality without
citizenship status, often to their disadvantage. But attention to alienage is
also theoretically important because it is a category in which different
understandings of citizenship converge in challenging ways. Alienage is
"about" citizenship as nationality, but it is also just as much "about"
citizenship in its other registers.
Consequently, I will consider the relationship among the various
understandings of citizenship as they converge in the alienage setting. Very
briefly, I will argue that alienage is a site where citizenship's contrasting
normative impulses-universalist and exclusionary-meet and compete in
ways which citizenship theory as a whole needs to attend to.
My comments are mainly conceptual, but they are motivated by two
convictions:
first, that mainstream citizenship theory (including
constitutional theory) is often too internally focused and needs to pay more
attention to national borders; and second, that the operation of borders
implicates some of the deepest questions of equal and democratic
citizenship that we face today.
To set the stage, I want to say a word about citizenship's analytical
orientation. Citizenship is an idea--or an optic-that looks both inward and
outward. On the one hand, we use the term to talk about social and political
* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. This is a slightly edited version of the remarks I
delivered at the New Dimensions of Citizenship Symposium at Fordham Law School. Many
thanks to Jennifer Gordon and Sheila Foster for organizing a stimulating symposium, and to
the editors of the Fordham Law Review for helpful assistance in preparing the remarks for
publication.
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relationships existing among people already assumed to be national
community members, at least nominally. When we talk about struggles for
"social citizenship," the commitment to achieving "equal citizenship," or
the demands of "democratic citizenship," we are usually talking about the
nature and quality of relations among those understood to be part of some
pre-constituted national society. (That is not to say we cannot talk about
citizenship across borders-I think we can-but the idea of transnational
citizenship remains marginal' and my current focus is on mainstream legal
and political theory.)
Yet although citizenship is often inward-looking, it also sometimes faces
outward as well. After all, we also use the term "citizenship" to talk about
borders-the borders that divide this membership community from the
world beyond. This is the citizenship of passports and nationality; it is the
citizenship which designates some people as national members and others
as national outsiders and limits the entry of those outsiders into the national
territory.
The fact of citizenship's dual analytical orientation can often be
confusing because it is not always clear which sort of "citizenship" is at
stake in any given conversation. For instance, when you hear someone
talking about "citizenship rights," it is not always apparent what the term's
reference is. Are these the rights that we understand individuals in liberal
democratic societies to be entitled to-the rights that are denied to those we
call "second-class citizens," or are they the rights that a person possesses by
virtue of holding the legal status of citizenship-the rights denied to aliens?
Sometimes these are the same thing, but not always. Think of Plyler v.
Doe. The educational right at issue was surely a right of "social
citizenship," yet, of course, the specific beneficiaries involved were status
2
noncitizens-undocumented noncitizens, for that matter.
But beyond this analytical confusion, citizenship's dual orientation also
presents us with certain challenges at the level of normative theory.
Implicit in any discussion of citizenship is the question, "Who?" Who
exactly is entitled to claim citizenship? Who are citizenship's rightful
subjects? When we ask these questions, it turns out that the inward-looking
understandings of citizenship and the border-focused understandings tend to
provide very different answers.
In its inward-looking mode, citizenship is usually understood to stand for
the inclusion and recognition of "everyone." This is what the political
theorist Iris Marion Young called the "ideal of universal citizenship." '3 It is,
notoriously, a failed or unachieved universality in many ways. But
universalism in the form of liberal-egalitarianism-in the form of an

1. See generally Linda Bosniak, CitizenshipDenationalized,7 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud.

447 (2000).
2. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
3. Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of
UniversalCitizenship, 99 Ethics 250 (1989).
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inclusionary, anti-caste ethic-is assumed to be the relevant normative
benchmark.
In contrast, citizenship in its border-conscious sense is usually
understood to entail a necessary degree of exclusivity and boundedness.
Citizenship of a nation presumes the existence of national outsiders; and, as
an institution, citizenship works to keep many people out. In this context,
exclusion is not apologized for; it is citizenship's normative core.
Now, if I were to ask you how it can be that citizenship stands for both
universalism and boundedness simultaneously-is there not a contradiction
here?-you might well respond that there is no paradox at all. It is simply a
matter of distinct jurisdictions. Citizenship stands for inclusion of persons
inside the community and exclusion of strangers at the community's edges.
These contrasting normative orientations apply in different spheres and are
perfectly complementary.
This conception of citizenship as jurisdictionally divided, as hard-on-theoutside and soft-on-the-inside, is widespread and makes a certain intuitive
sense. 4 Yet, it is problematic for at least two reasons. For one thing (and I
can only gesture at this now), it raises crucial questions about the legitimacy
of citizenship's hard outer shell. From a liberal egalitarian perspective, why
should we accept national exclusion at all?
Moreover, even if we concede the legitimacy of borders, there is another
problem with the account: Its empirical premises about jurisdictional
separation are untenable. The fact is that citizenship's exclusionary
commitments are not always confined to the community's territorial edges;
rather, citizenship's "border" operates on the territorial inside as well.
Indeed, it is the internalized border that defines aliens as aliens, that
imposes conditions on their presence, and that claims the authority to detain
and deport them in various circumstances. It is also the internalized border
that is invoked to justify discriminatory and marginalizing treatment of
noncitizens, or aliens, in a variety of contexts. So the border is not just "out
there"; it is in here as well.
On the other hand, it is important to understand that aliens are not wholly
defined by this internalized border. They are also sometimes treated as
subjects of the universalist commitments that animate citizenship in its
inward-looking mode. In this country and elsewhere, a great many
important rights-constitutional rights, but also common law rights and
statutory rights-are extended not merely to status citizens but to all
territorially present persons, including aliens. That is true whether they are
here legally or not. For this reason, the apparently self-evident notion that
"citizenship is for citizens" is not always true: Noncitizens are also the
subjects of citizenship in some respects.
What I want to emphasize, therefore, is that alienage is a site where
citizenship's contrasting normative projects intersect-it is a space of
4. For extensive discussion of this conception of citizenship, see Linda Bosniak, The
Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (2006).
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jurisdictional overlap (or concurrent jurisdiction, if you will). And in this
space, these normative projects endlessly compete for primacy. As it turns
out, the border very often prevails, because it has de facto trumping power:
The possibility of deportation keeps many noncitizens, especially the
undocumented, from enforcing the rights that they are formally guaranteed.
Additionally, the border is often accorded a kind of institutionalized
trumping. power through the so-called plenary power doctrine in
immigration law, pursuant to which the government's border control
authority takes precedence over the rights of individuals. Still, the scope
and impact of the border are not absolute: They remain constrained, to
some degree, by operation of equality norms associated with citizenship in
its universalist mode.
Understanding this interplay helps us to understand the push and pull of
some of our current debates over the status of immigrants, from drivers'
licenses to disaster relief to local police enforcement of immigration law.
These debates are invariably structured by disagreements over the
legitimate scope of the national border as a regulatory domain. At stake is
the question of how far into the lives of aliens the border can, and should
extend. Advocates for immigrants strive to insulate noncitizens from the
action of the border in the name of equality and community-to build
firewalls against the internal operation of the border through
noncooperation policies, non-reporting policies and similar efforts.
they can to tear that
Meanwhile, anti-immigrant activists do everything
5
insulation away and give the border full reign.
I began this essay by saying that paying attention to alienage is
theoretically important for citizenship scholarship as a whole. It is
important analytically for some of the reasons I have described, but it is
also important for normative reasons-and I will conclude with a word on
that. The status of aliens is, I believe, inherently challenging for citizenship
theory.
It is challenging because, on the one hand, the kind of
marginalization experienced by aliens often appears unjust from within an
equal citizenship framework. But it can also sometimes appear necessary,
since (the argument goes) without the operation of national boundaries,
there could be no functioning political community within which universal
citizenship can be pursued. On this view, we can certainly work to make
citizenship status easier to obtain, and we can make sure noncitizens receive
important basic protections to the extent they remain noncitizens, but at the
end of the day, not everyone who sets foot in the country is going to be
granted immediate and automatic citizenship, and so the exclusions inherent
in alienage are, to some extent, inescapable.
I recognize the force of this argument-but I do not think that can be the
end of the conversation. We know that historically, the ideal of universal

5. See Linda

Bosniak,

Confidentiality Policies, Reporting Requirements, and

Enforcement Mandates: ContendingApproaches to UnauthorizedImmigration, in Debating

Immigration (Carol Swain ed., forthcoming 2007).
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citizenship has served as a powerful resource for emancipatory struggles by
various outsider groups. The ideas of equal citizenship and democratic
citizenship have been invoked to support breaking down social barriersbarriers whose dismantling originally seemed unthinkable. Today, the
question we are faced with is how far this universalizing dynamic can
extend. Can it extend, in particular, to the national border itself?
The conventional answer is that the border lies beyond citizenship's
universalist range; the borderframes the map but can not itself be on it. I
am attracted to a different reading, one that views national borders as in
need of dismantling like other boundaries that were once viewed as
inevitable. On this alternative reading, we would deploy citizenship against
itself, we would challenge national restrictions on movement and
membership by invoking universal conceptions of citizenship against
exclusionary understandings. I know this will sound utopian to many ears,
but citizenship has always had a fundamentally aspirational quality. In fact,
it is precisely this quality which, I believe, has made the concept so deeply
compelling to so many-activists and scholars alike.

Notes & Observations

